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On July 1, 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC)became operational following establishment by theRome Statute.1 The Court is made up of the
Presidency, an Appeals Division, a Trial Division, Pre-Trial
Division, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry.2 The
purpose of the Court is to provide a means to bring to justice
the perpetrators of “the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community . . . .”3 The crimes within the juris-
diction of the court are the crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.4 To date, no
crime of aggression has been charged.
One case is pending before the Pre-Trial Division5 and six
cases are being tried before a Trial Chamber,6 leaving eleven
cases where the defendants are at large and warrants have been
issued for their arrests7 and two cases where a Pre-Trial
Chamber refused to confirm charges.8 The jurisprudence of
the ICC results from the decisions in these cases by the Pre-
Trial, Trial, and Appeals Divisions interpreting the Statute of
Rome, the Elements of Crimes, and the Court’s Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. Following that, the Court may look
to applicable treaties and the principles and rules of interna-
tional law. Lastly, the Court may under certain circumstances
review the national law of states.9
PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER
The major role of the Pre-Trial Chamber once a defendant
has been brought before it is to conduct a hearing to determine
whether the prosecutor has brought forth “sufficient evidence
to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person com-
mitted each of the crimes charged.”10 If the prosecutor has met
that burden, the Pre-Trial Chamber sends the defendant to the
Trial Chamber for trial.11 This process is similar to any proba-
ble-cause hearing in the United States. However, the confirma-
tion decisions issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber are substan-
tially different than those in the U.S. The confirmation deci-
sions are quite long, ranging, for example, from 157 pages in
Lubanga to 226 pages in Katanga and Ngudjolo.12 These deci-
sions may contain a discussion of the factual background, pre-
liminary evidentiary matters, material elements of the crimes,
and modes of liability. Each discussion is footnoted at great
length to the prosecution and defense briefs.13
The Pre-Trial Chamber in its confirmation decision in
Katanga and Ngudjolo in effect usurps the authority of the Trial
Chamber by setting forth the mode of criminal responsibility
that the prosecutor is bound to follow. The Statute of Rome
was carefully constructed to include virtually all methods of
criminal responsibility, and it states:
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that per-
son:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individ-
ual, jointly with another or through another
person, regardless of whether that other person
is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of
such a crime which in fact occurs or is
attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission
of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists
in its commission or its attempted commis-
sion, including providing the means for its
commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commis-
sion or attempted commission of such a crime
by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional
and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the
criminal activity or criminal purpose of
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ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Pre-Trial Chamber I (Jan. 29, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.pdf;
Decision on Confirmation of Charges, The Prosecutor v. Katanga
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the group, where such activity or purpose
involves the commission of a crime within
the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the inten-
tion of the group to commit the crime;
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and
publicly incites others to commit genocide;
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking
action that commences its execution by means
of a substantial step, but the crime does not
occur because of circumstances independent of
the person’s intentions. However, a person who
abandons the effort to commit the crime or
otherwise prevents the completion of the crime
shall not be liable for punishment under this
Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if
that person completely and voluntarily gave up
the criminal purpose.14
A close review of this language indicates that criminal
responsibility exists for one’s own acts, acts done jointly with
or through another person, complicity, aiding or abetting, or
acting through a group of persons. Also, criminal responsibil-
ity exists based on actions or inactions as a commander.15
Furthermore, no indication shows one mode is more or less
serious than another because all modes are subject to the same
level of punishment.16 However, the Pre-Trial Chamber in
Katanga and Ngudjolo must have believed that actions con-
tained in subsections (b), (c), and (d) were less serious than
those contained in subsection (a). In a tortured interpretation
of this subsection, the Pre-Trial Chamber devised a scheme
whereby an individual can be criminally liable for the acts of
another’s subordinates. This interpretation was clearly unnec-
essary because such acts are criminally liable under subsec-
tions (b), (c), or (d). The only reason for this interpretation is
that conviction under subsection (b), (c), or (d) was believed
to be less serious as an accessory rather than under subsection
(a) as a principal. 
The practical effect of this determination is that the Trial
Chamber is now bound by the Pre-Trial Chamber’s confirma-
tion of charges, which includes this mode of liability.
Furthermore, this mode of liability was not the method of proof
that was desired by the prosecutor, which in effect also binds
the prosecutor’s hands.17 In summary, the Pre-Trial Chamber
exceeded its authority while limiting the options of both the
prosecutor and the judges who would try the case. While a Trial
Chamber has the authority to act as a Pre-Trial Chamber,18 it
has not done so. It appears the
Trial Chamber has ceded its
authority to the Pre-Trial
Chamber to determine which
mode of criminal responsibility
is appropriate. It is interesting to
note that in Katanga and
Ngudjolo the court requested
briefs from the parties regarding
the mode of responsibility.19 No
decision was made on that issue,
and the case proceeded to trial. Closing arguments have been
completed and still this issue hangs over the case.  Apparently
the court will resolve this issue when it renders a verdict. 
TRIAL
Trials are held before three-judge panels at the ICC.20
Because judges elected to the ICC bench are not required to
have judicial experience,21 two of the eight judges assigned to
the Trial Division have no judicial experience and little if any
trial experience.22 The drafters of the Rome Statute desired that
2/3 of the judges have experience as a judge, prosecutor, or
advocate. The remaining judges should have expertise in inter-
national law, which results in many of those judges being aca-
demics. Obviously, the skill sets necessary to be an academic
and a judge are significantly different. 
Trials at the ICC contain factors that simply to do not exist
in most American courtrooms. Because the official languages
of the court are both French and English, participants in the
trial may speak one language but not the other. As a result, the
court must have significant electronic facilities such that each
counsel, judge, and other participant has available headphones
to hear the statements of those at trial as those statements are
translated by a group of interpreters. In Katanga and Ngudjolo,
the Congolese witnesses also need interpreters. This obviously
slows down the trial process.
Another interesting aspect of the ICC is the prominent role
of victims. The court is required to take appropriate measures
to assure the physical and mental well-being of victims.23 The
court may allow victims not only to be present at trial but also
to participate as a party. Witnesses are entitled to be repre-
sented by counsel, who may question witnesses during trial
and call their own witnesses.24 This substantial difference
between trials in American courts and the ICC carries the dan-
ger of a victim’s counsel acting in effect as a second prosecutor.
Their participation increases the length of the trial to the detri-
ment of the defendant who is in custody. 
14. ROME STAT.  art. 25 (3).
15. Id. at  art. 28.
16. Id. at  art. 77.
17. See Katanga, supra note 12, at para. 469. 
18. ROME STAT.  art. 64 (6) (a).
19. See Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief on the Interpretation of Art. 25
(3) (a), Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-1541 (Oct. 19, 2009), available
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/
situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104
%200107/court%20records/filing%20of%20the%20participants/of
fice%20of%20the%20prosecutor/1541?lan=fr-FR.
20. ROME STAT.  art. 39 (2) (b) (ii) &  art. 61 (11).
21. Id. at art. 36 (3) (b).
22. See Structure of the Court:  Trial Division, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/structure%20of%20the
%20court/chambers/trial%20division/trial%20division?lan=en-
GB (last visited Feb. 27, 2012) (supplying biographical informa-
tion of the trial division judges).
23. ROME STAT. art. 68 (1).
24. Id. at art. 68 (3).
Court Review - Volume 47 103
The court may
allow victims 
not only to be
present at trial
but also to 
participate as 
a party.
Like in the U.S., defendants
are entitled to be represented
by counsel. These attorneys
are paid by the court.25 The
defense’s costs, which include
multiple attorneys, investiga-
tors, and support staff, are
staggering. In Katanga and
Ngudjolo, the 2008 budget for
each defendant was 472,459
and 442,309 euros, respec-
tively.26 The conversion rate to
U.S. dollars is approximately $614,196 and $575,001. 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
SPEEDY TRIAL 
As a result of the confirmation practices of the Pre-Trial
Chamber, the length of time existing between arrest and trial
is certainly a concern. For example, Thomas Lubanga was
taken into custody on March 17, 2006, charges were con-
firmed on January 29, 2007, and his trial began on January 26,
2009. He was found guilty on March 14, 2012, but has yet to
be sentenced. Germain Katanga was placed in custody on
October 17, 2007. Matthieu Ngudjolo was taken into custody
February 6, 2008. The charges were confirmed on September
30, 2008, and trial began on November 24, 2009. Jean-Pierre
Bemba was taken into custody on May 24, 2008, the confir-
mation of charges was issued on June 15, 2009, and trial com-
menced on November 22, 2010.27 None of these trials have
concluded. The ICC is required to bring defendants to trial
without undue delay;28 however, these time frames, ranging
from 21 months to nearly 3 years, do not square with U.S.
concepts of a speedy trial. 
As discussed above, the participation of witnesses creates
delay. How the court schedules its calendar also affects this
delay. For example, the Katanga and Ngudjolo trial is held in
either morning or afternoon sessions. The remaining time is left
for other court business. Much of that business is another inter-
esting facet of the ICC that adds to the delay in reaching a final
determination. While some decisions on motions before the
Trial Chamber are issued from the bench, many are written.
Each decision is written in the same format as confirmation
decisions in that it is completely footnoted as to facts, prosecu-
tion and defense positions, and the court’s decision. Each one of
these proposed decisions must be drafted and circulated among
the judges for review, changes, and agreement. These decisions
can be lengthy from a U.S. perspective.29 The process is more
akin to an appellate court proceeding. Delay can also be attrib-
uted to the lack of trial or judicial experience among the judges. 
The jurisprudence of the ICC has interesting differences
from the U.S. system. For example, the Rome Statute lists a
series of defendant’s rights that are similar to rights guaranteed
by the U.S. Constitution; however, when one delves into the
decisions of the court, it becomes obvious that stark differ-
ences exist. Clearly the right to a speedy trial discussed above
is one of those. 
CONFRONTATION/HEARSAY
One of the strongest protections provided to a criminal
defendant and embodied in the Sixth Amendment is the right
to confront the witnesses upon whose testimony the state
relies for conviction. This provision assures a defendant that he
or she may test through cross-examination a witness’s truth-
fulness. Furthermore, the confrontation clause allows a defen-
dant to examine the accuracy of a witness, the witness’s mem-
ory, and the meaning and sincerity of the witness’s testimony.
Without this protection, there lies a real and ever-present dan-
ger that an individual could be wrongfully convicted.
Within the ICC’s founding document rests an apparently
similar provision to the Sixth Amendment.30 This provision
indicates a defendant shall have minimum guarantees, includ-
ing “[t]o examine, or have examined, the witnesses against
him or her . . . .” While this subsection appears to be rela-
tively straightforward, when one examines the decisions of the
ICC, it is apparent that this protection is illusory at best. 
The ICC’s approach to the admission of hearsay and its
reliance on judges determining the probative value of hearsay
evidence leaves the Rome Statute’s guarantee of confrontation
tenuous. The ICC has found first that the exclusion of hearsay
evidence is not expressly provided by the Statute.31
Furthermore, in Katanga and Ngudjolo, the Pre-Trial Chamber
determined that “any challenges to hearsay evidence may
affect its probative value, but not its admissibility.”32 The
chamber did address confrontation and the determination of
25. Id. at art. 67 (1) (b).
26. Report on Different Legal Aid Mechanisms Before International
Criminal Jurisdictions, ICC-ASP/7/23 (Oct. 31, 2008), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP7/ICC-ASP-7-
23%20English.pdf.
27. See Situations and Cases, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Cases/
(last visited 27 Feb. 2012) (supplying dates of apprehension).
28. ROME STAT. art. 67 (1) (c).
29. See Corrigendum to Decision on Prosecution Motion for
Admission of Prior Recorded Testimony of Witness P-02 and
Accompanying Video Excerpts, Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-2289-
Corr-Red, Trial Chamber II, (Aug. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/F7695FFB-40B0-4231-A3B7-
40C915B556CA.htm; Order in Relation to Disclosure of Identity
of P-143, Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-1817, Trial Chamber II, (Feb.
1, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/
AA43436E-8447-42DA-8942-AF1C6E716A5B.htm; Decision of
the Communication of P-316’s Statement, Katanga, ICC-01/04-
01/00-1728-Red, Trial Chamber II, (Dec. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situ-
ations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%2
00107/court%20records/chambers/trial%20chamber%20ii/1728?l
an=en-GB.
30. ROME STAT. art. 67(1) (e).
31. Decision Regarding Protocol on Practices to be Used to Prepare
Witnesses for Trial, Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 at para. 41, Trial
Chamber I (May 23, 2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/icc-
docs/doc/doc494990.pdf.
32. Decision on Confirmation of Charges, Katanga, supra note 12, at
para. 137.
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probative value when it stated “the parties’ inability to cross-
examine a Prosecution source is simply one factor in the
Chamber’s determination of the probative value accorded to
the evidence in question.”33 The ICC also looks to the text of
the Rome Statute and its own rules of evidence for its position
that the Chamber can consider this type of evidence.34 If one
examines Article 69 (3), the second sentence states:   “The
Court shall have the authority to request the submission of all
evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of
the truth.”35 The ICC and other national jurisdictions have a
strong reliance on appropriate judicial determination of proba-
tive value to obtain the truth, while in U.S. courts, the hearsay
rule makes this determination unnecessary because trustwor-
thiness of an out-of-court statement is found to be inherently
lacking unless it falls within an exception to the rule. In the
U.S., every law student has drilled into him or her the impor-
tance of the confrontation clause and underlying reason for the
hearsay rule. Instead, the ICC views this as a hindrance to the
determination of the truth. 
A recent decision by Trial Chamber III in Bemba once again
provides insight into the immense differences in jurisprudence
between the U.S. and the ICC. In a 17-page decision, the court
admitted as prima facie evidence all documents submitted by
the prosecutor before the start of the presentation of evi-
dence.36 The Court distinguished admission of evidence and
the probative value to be given it at the end of the trial. The
Court justified its action as ensuring the proper conduct of the
trial. Furthermore, the court believed that the drafters of the
Statute wanted to avoid the “technical formalities of the com-
mon law system of admissibility of evidence in favour of the
flexibility of the civil law system . . . .”37 Fortunately, this
decision was reversed on appeal.38 Twelve of the eighteen
judges at the ICC come from civil-law systems.39 This mixture
of civil-law and common-law judges creates its own set of
problems as the court attempts to provide a coherent approach
to trial and criminal procedure.
The result of these conflicting views is apparent. In the U.S.,
a defendant has protection under our Constitution and the
rules of evidence. At the ICC, in contrast, a defendant is at the
mercy of a judge’s determination of probative value without the
safeguards of cross-examination and rules limiting the admis-
sion of evidence.
REASONABLE DOUBT/DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Another interesting difference in jurisprudence is our con-
cept of reasonable doubt.
Without considering the defini-
tion of this term, most jurisdic-
tions in the U.S. require that a
verdict be unanimous. Every
prosecutor and defense attorney
understands that a single juror
voting not guilty constitutes a
win for the defense. 
The decisions of a Trial
Chamber at the ICC are made not by a jury, but rather by a
three-judge panel.40 Like in the U.S., those subject to the juris-
diction of the ICC are presumed innocent.41 The burden of
proof at the ICC is also beyond a reasonable doubt.42 However,
the two jurisdictions split on how sufficient proof is counted.
The Rome Statute urges the judges to seek unanimity, but if it
is lacking, a simple majority is sufficient to establish guilt.43
Therefore, a judge with strong doubts as to the veracity of
important witnesses or the probative value of evidence pre-
sented has no ability to affect the finding unless that individ-
ual can sway an additional judge to his or her point of view.
It is interesting to compare the ICC’s view of double jeop-
ardy with that of U.S. jurisdictions. The Double Jeopardy
clause of the Fifth Amendment has protected citizens from the
government’s attempt to obtain a conviction once a jury has
rendered a not-guilty verdict. Absent extreme circumstances, a
finding of not guilty by a jury simply prevents the retrial of a
criminal defendant for the same charge. 
The Rome Statute provides defendants with an apparently
similar protection as that contained in the Fifth Amendment.
It reads:  “Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall
be tried before the Court with respect to conduct which
formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been con-
victed or acquitted by the Court.”44 The term “except as pro-
vided in this Statute” leads to the procedure for appeals within
the statute. After conviction, the prosecutor has the right to
appeal a procedural error, a factual error, or an error of law.45
While it is procedurally possible in the U.S. for a prosecutor to
obtain appellate review for errors in procedure and law, it is
nearly impossible to obtain review of the factual determination
made by the jury. 
During the process of deliberation, a Trial Chamber must,
like juries in the U.S., weigh the evidence and issue a verdict.
It is required to issue a written decision, which contains a “full
and reasoned statement of the Trial Chamber’s findings on the
33. Id. at para.109.
34. ROME STAT. art. 64 (9) (a); ICC Rules of Proc. & Evidence, Rule 63
(2).
35. Id. at 69 (3).
36. Decision on Admission into Evidence of Material Contained in
Prosecution’s List of Evidence, Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-1022,
Trial Chamber III, (Nov. 19, 2010), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc969801.pdf.
37. Id. at para. 17.
38. Judgment on the appeals of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and the
Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber III entitled
“Decision on the Admission into Evidence of Materials Contained
in the Prosecution's List of Evidence," Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08
OA 5 OA 6, Appeals Chamber (May 3, 2011), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1066048.pdf
39. Judges Blattmann, Cotte, Diarra, Gurmendi, Kaul, Kourula, Odio
Benito, Steiner, Tarfusser, Trendafilova, Usacka, and Van den
Wyngaert.
40. ROME STAT. art. 39 (2) (b) (ii).
41. Id. at  art. 66 (1).
42. Id. at  art. 66 (3).
43. Id. at  art. 74 (3).
44. Id. at  art. 20 (1).
45. Id. at  art. 81 (1) (a).
It is interesting 
to compare the
ICC's view of 
double jeopardy
with that of U.S.
jurisdictions.
Court Review - Volume 47 105
46. Id. at  art. 74 (5).
47. Id. at  art. 83 (2 ) (a)-(b).
48. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 294 (3d ed. 2007).
49. ROME STAT. art. 69 (7).
50. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
51. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
52. Decision on Confirmation of Charges, Lubanga, supra note 12, at
para. 82.
53. Id. at para. 86.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Decision on Admission of Material from “Bar Table,” Lubanga,
ICC-01/04-01/06-1981 at para. 48, Trial Chamber I (June 24,
2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ doc
702244.pdf.
57. Id. at. para. 45.
evidence and conclusions.”46
It is from this decision that a
prosecutor may appeal a fac-
tual determination. The
options available to the
Appeals Division upon
review of the Trial Chamber’s
decision include ordering a
new trial before a different
Trial Chamber or reversing or
amending the decision.47 It
appears from this statutory
framework that the Appeals Division of the ICC can reverse a
finding of not guilty and enter a finding of guilty based on its
determination that the Trial Chamber made a mistake of fact.
In other words, judges who have not heard the live testimony
of the witnesses or had the opportunity to judge their credibil-
ity can enter a finding of guilty. While this apparent authority
vested in the Appeals Division is disconcerting, no indication
as yet shows whether it will be exercised. 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In the U.S., the exclusionary rule is a well-founded doctrine
designed to deter police violations of citizens’ constitutional
rights. During the drafting of the Rome Statute, a division
between common-law and civil-law advocates on the rules of
evidence existed. The final result was a “delicate combination”
of the two.48 The ICC’s founding document recognizes that evi-
dence may be obtained in violation of accepted rules. It reads:
Evidence obtained by means of a violation of this
Statute or internationally recognized human rights shall
not be admissible if:
• The violation casts substantial doubt on the reli-
ability of the evidence; or
• The admission of the evidence would be anti-
thetical to and would seriously damage the
integrity of the proceedings.49
If determined that evidence was illegally obtained, the court
must then engage in a two-pronged test to determine if it will
admit the contested evidence. The first prong relates to the reli-
ability of evidence. If it is reliable, the violation has no bearing
on admissibility. The second prong suggests that serious dam-
age to the integrity of the proceedings is the lynchpin upon
which a decision will be made. In Mapp v. Ohio,50 the United
States Supreme Court found that “the imperative of judicial
integrity” was one of the justifications for the application of the
exclusionary rule. More recently, the Court relied on the deter-
rence of police misconduct as the prime justification.51
The Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga addressed the issue of
evidence it found to have been obtained in violation of recog-
nized human rights.52 The Chamber, in discussing the issue of
“integrity of the proceedings,” stated:  “. . . in the fight against
impunity, it must ensure an appropriate balance between the
rights of the accused and the need to respond to victims’ and
the international community’s expectations.”53 The Chamber
continued, indicating that exclusion would result only from
“serious human rights violation[s].”54 Like in the U.S., the
Chamber understood the difficulty in balancing the “contra-
dictory and complex matters of principle.”55 The Trial
Chamber upheld the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision on the
application of the exclusionary rule.56 Furthermore, the Trial
Chamber went on to question whether deterrence of illegal
police activity was a concern of the court.57 Clearly, the
jurisprudence of the ICC reflects the desire to leave in the
hands of the judges what evidence should be heard and what
weight is to be given such evidence.
WITNESS PREPARATION/WITNESS PROOFING
Preparing one’s witnesses for trial is a longstanding and
well-accepted practice among American lawyers. Rarely are
judges even involved in the process. It is not unusual for law
firms to have courtroom facilities within their offices so that
witness’s testimony can be rehearsed. At the ICC, this practice
is divided into two separate areas of witness familiarization and
witness preparation.
The court has approved the process of witness familiariza-
tion as an important practice for witnesses. That process
includes the following:
a. Assisting the witness to understand fully the Court
proceedings, its participants and their respective
roles;
b. Reassuring the witness about her role in proceedings
before the Court;
c. Ensuring that the witness clearly understands she is
under a strict legal obligation to tell the truth when
testifying;
d. Explaining to the witness the process of examination
first by the Prosecution and subsequently by the
Defence;
e. Discussing matters that are related to the security and
safety of the witness in order to determine the neces-
sity of applications for protective measures before the
Court; and
f. Making arrangements with the Prosecution in order to
provide the witness with an opportunity to acquaint
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58. “Decision Regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise
Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial,” Lubanga, ICC-01/14-
01/06-1049, Trial Chamber I (Nov. 30, 2007), para. 29.
59. Id., paras. 51 and 52.
herself with the Prosecution’s Trial Lawyer and others
who may examine the witness in Court.58
However, the court takes a very different view from
American practices when it comes to witness preparation.
While recognizing that many national jurisdictions and other
international criminal tribunals allow witness preparation, the
Trial Chamber in Lubanga charted a different course for the
ICC. While the Chamber allowed a witness to review a previ-
ously written statement, it forbade counsel from discussing
other topics or evidence. The court stated:
. . . the Trial Chamber is not convinced that either
greater efficiency or the establishment of the truth will
be achieved by [witness preparation]. Rather, it is the
opinion of the Chamber that this could lead to a distor-
tion of the truth and may come dangerously close to con-
stituting a rehearsal of in-court testimony. . . . A
rehearsed witness may not provide the entirety or the
true extent of his memory or knowledge of a subject, and
the Trial Chamber would wish to hear the totality of an
individual’s recollection. . . . Finally, the Trial Chamber
is of the opinion that the preparation of witness testi-
mony by parties prior to trial may diminish what would
otherwise be helpful spontaneity during the giving of
evidence by a witness. The spontaneous nature of testi-
mony can be of paramount importance to the Court’s
ability to find the truth, and the Trial Chamber is not
willing to lose such an important element in the pro-
ceedings.59
Obviously, that Chamber believes witness preparation is not
conducive to finding the truth. Contrary to standard American
legal thought, many questions will be asked without counsel
knowing what the answer will be. 
CONCLUSION
The jurisprudence of the ICC is a work in progress. It is a
daunting task to establish a framework to try some of the most
notorious crimes occurring throughout the world. The court
works at a disadvantage because some judges lack judicial or
trial experience. It is especially difficult given the differences
existing between the civil-law and common-law systems in the
approach to and conduct of trials. Clearly that court relies
heavily on judges weighing the evidence—some of which
would not be admitted in the U.S. It is also apparent that some
of the constitutional rights afforded individuals in the U.S.,
which appear to be protected by the Statute of Rome, are in fact
not protected. 
The mission of the ICC is to assure that the most serious
crimes are punished, to end the impunity for those who com-
mit such crimes, and to give voice and protection to victims.
The court’s success in achieving these goals remains to be seen.
Only time will tell whether the decisions made will obtain
international acceptance and approval. Until the court has a
proven history of acceptable court management and jurispru-
dence, one must expect that countries such as the U.S., China,
and Russia will not submit to its jurisdiction.
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